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Abstract 
 
This study was conducted in the context of the China–UK Cooperation on African Trade and 
Investment for Poverty Reduction. It focuses on the evolution of bilateral relations between 
China and the UK towards trilateral relations with Africa and on building a framework for 
future cooperation. Special attention is given to infrastructure, agriculture and trade 
facilitation. It analyses the current engagement of Kenya and South Africa with the UK and 
China. Main findings and recommendations are that South Africa and Kenya should be linked 
more to global value chains and to raise the awareness of it as a possible outsourcing 
destination. Reducing non-tariff barriers between the countries could generate positive 
impact for local livelihoods and welfare-enhancing effects. Sharing more information and 
enhancing transparency is recommended for further success in the trilateral cooperation. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The last decade has been characterised by an increased dynamism in the trade of 
developing countries. A key driver of developing country exports, China saw its share of 
world trade more than quadruple from 3 per cent to more than 12 per cent between 2000 and 
2015. Developed countries, meanwhile, have seen their share shrink considerably. For the 
same period, the UK’s share of global trade halved – even though the country’s exports 
continued to grow in nominal terms (UNCTAD n.d.). Taken together, these trends point to a 
new global trade geography and in particular to the rise of the South.  
 
Outside Asia, developing countries have achieved more modest gains. Between 2000 and 
2014, Africa’s share of world trade only increased from 2.3 to 2.9 per cent (UNCTAD n.d.). 
While South–South trade can offer new opportunities for growth and poverty reduction, it is 
clear that many African countries still face serious constraints in accessing regional and 
global markets. China and the UK each have sought to enhance Africa’s trade position 
through developmental and commercial channels. More recently, however, there have been 
signs of a stronger China–UK bilateral relationship: the UK joined the new China-led Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, and during his October 2015 state visit to the UK, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping signed £30bn in business deals (HM Treasury 2015; PMO 2015).  
 
Against this background of strengthened China–UK ties, the study here explores how the two 
countries might collaborate to support African growth and poverty reduction, examining 
possible synergies among their respective policies. Specifically, it evaluates China–Africa, 
UK–Africa and China–UK–Africa economic engagement to craft a framework for future 
trilateral cooperation targeting poverty. Using this framework, it delves into the two cases of 
Kenya and South Africa, countries with distinct economic profiles but similar potential to 
harness trade for poverty reduction. Indeed, South Africa and Kenya have maintained their 
share of global exports, implying that both nations have seen their exports grow more quickly 
than those of the UK.  
 
Divided into four main parts, the study first details how Chinese and UK bilateral relations in 
Africa have expanded to new modes of trilateral cooperation. It next builds a framework for 
future China–UK–Africa cooperation, highlighting China–UK complementarities in three 
areas central to the African poverty reduction agenda: infrastructure, agriculture and trade 
facilitation. It then presents the cases of Kenya and South Africa and examines their 
engagement with China and the UK across trade, investment and development assistance 
channels. It concludes with a discussion of opportunities for cooperation in the two case 
countries and provides recommendations for action.    
1.1 From bilateral to trilateral cooperation in Africa 
While possessing distinct historical experiences and trajectories, neither China nor the UK is 
a new entrant to economic cooperation on the African continent. Over the past 60 years, both 
countries have sought to strengthen their bilateral engagement with African countries across 
aid, trade and investment channels. Now, however, novel modes of trilateral cooperation are 
emerging as development partners begin to recognise complementarities and the potential 
for financial and technical collaboration (OECD 2016). The following sections explore past 
and present China–Africa, UK–Africa and China–UK–Africa engagement to construct an 
effective framework for enhancing future trilateral cooperation. 
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1.2 China–Africa cooperation 
Following the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government 
initiated various forms of economic cooperation with African countries. Drawing on its own 
domestic experience, it emphasised self-reliance, especially that achieved through 
agricultural development and food security. As such, in the new government’s first three 
decades, about 39 per cent of officially supported foreign development projects involved 
agriculture. From 1971 to 1975, China dispatched 670 agricultural experts to 25 African 
countries, where it invested US$33m in irrigation, built numerous agricultural extension 
stations and encouraged the formation of cooperatives across the continent. 
 
The 1980s and 1990s – the first two decades of the reform era – saw a significant decrease 
in China’s overseas development activities and a shift to a business-oriented model of 
assistance. Accordingly, China established joint ventures and introduced the household 
responsibility system abroad. It also began to promote multidimensional economic 
cooperation combining aid, trade and investment (Gu et al. 2015, 2016). After 2000, Chinese 
outbound development assistance began to grow again, with officially reported flows to Africa 
increasing steadily from a total of US$17.3bn for 1950–2009 to approximately US$7.5bn for 
2010–12. Concurrently, the proportion of African disbursements within China’s total foreign 
assistance budget increased from 46 per cent in 2009 to 52 per cent in 2012 (State Council 
2011, 2014).  
 
Throughout its reform era engagement with Africa, China has consistently emphasised 
infrastructure-led growth and agricultural development. According to the UN’s Economic 
Report on Africa 2012, from 2001 to 2009, Chinese financial support for African infrastructure 
totalled US$14bn (UNECA 2012: 118). The State Council’s second white paper on foreign 
aid reported that from 2010 to 2012, the country financed 86 economic infrastructure projects 
across the region. In the agricultural sector, China has constructed 14 demonstration centres 
in Africa, and begun the planning and implementation of another eight centres. Not unlike its 
Mao era development initiatives, the country has also dispatched numerous agricultural 
experts to Africa and trained more than 5,000 African agro-technicians (State Council 2014). 
 
Operating in tandem with its outbound development assistance, China’s trade and 
investment in African countries has also expanded rapidly. According to China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics, the total value of trade in goods between China and Africa reached 
US$221.7bn in 2014, an increase of US$11.4bn year-on-year.1 As for investment, Chinese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Africa totalled US$32.4bn in 2014. Broadly speaking, 
strong economic complementarities between China and Africa – along with linkages between 
their respective phases of development – have stimulated trade and investment flows. While 
China has an absolute advantage in industrial products and some service products (e.g. 
engineering construction), Africa enjoys an absolute or comparative advantage in natural 
resources. As a consequence of this economic structure, African countries mainly export raw 
materials to China while importing Chinese industrial products and infrastructure services. 
China’s investment in the region follows a similar pattern, primarily focusing on engineering 
construction and raw materials.2  
 
Key Chinese initiatives cross-cutting aid, trade and investment include the construction of six 
economic and trade cooperation zones, the establishment of the China–Africa Development 
Fund and the provision of large loans and credit lines to recipient governments. In 2007, 
China built its first economic and trade cooperation zone in Zambia, allowing China to gain 
experience in zone construction while promoting African trade and local employment. That 
same year, it launched the China–Africa Development Fund to support Chinese companies 
                                                        
1 For sub-Saharan Africa, this figure is closer to US$193.4bn.  
2 These particular trade and investment patterns are not exclusive to the China–Africa relationship; indeed, other international 
partners active in the region concentrate on the same sectors.   
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investing in Africa, particularly those focused on agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, 
and cultural industries.3 Meanwhile, from 2001 to 2010, the Export–Import Bank of China – 
the country’s official export credit agency – provided US$67.2bn in loans to Africa, exceeding 
the World Bank’s US$55bn to Africa for the same period (UNECA 2012: 118). 
 
Despite continued emphasis on infrastructure, China’s engagement with Africa has evolved 
beyond the ‘hard’ sectors of development. A 2011 African Development Bank (AfDB) report 
observed that the China–Africa relationship had shifted from a relatively narrow focus on 
trade and investment to a broader consideration of development issues (Gu and Schiere 
2011). Chinese experts likewise noted that China’s engagement on the continent has 
expanded into ‘soft’ areas of development, combining aid with trade and investment to target 
and reduce poverty more effectively (Gu 2009; Zhang 2013). During Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang’s visit to Ethiopia in 2014, this shift in focus was apparent. Specifically, the Chinese 
Premier proposed the ‘461 Framework’ for a China–Africa strategic partnership, 
underscoring four key principles: equality, solidarity and mutual trust, inclusive development 
and innovative cooperation. According to the framework, China and Africa would pursue new 
projects in six areas: industry, finance, poverty reduction, ecological and environmental 
protection, humanity and cultural exchange, and peace and security. They would also 
continue to regard the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation as the one central platform for 
collective dialogue and practical cooperation (Australian Centre on China in the World 2014). 
 
In sum, China has played a vital role in the acceleration of Africa’s economic growth. 
Chinese demand has fuelled a resource boom across Africa while its investment has 
targeted bottlenecks impeding development, especially in infrastructure (Dollar 2016). At the 
same time, China–Africa economic cooperation has helped change perceptions of the 
African continent, driving new wealth flows into the region. For African governments, China 
has afforded them an alternative to traditional bilateral and multilateral partners. 
Schmaljohann and Prizzon (2015) referred to the worldwide increase in donors and 
development mechanisms as indicative of an ‘age of choice’. From interviews with key 
stakeholders in six Asian and African countries, they found ‘developing country government 
officials welcomed more options for financing development, which for them outweighs the 
costs associated with greater fragmentation’ (2015: 8). Furthermore, they observed that for 
some recipient countries, the multi-donor landscape had enhanced their role in negotiating 
and managing development finance (ibid.). 
 
These benefits notwithstanding, China’s engagement with Africa has faced several 
challenges, such as how to balance efficiency and quality in the pursuit of sustainable 
development (He 2011; Gu and Carty 2014). Within the literature, the main criticisms of 
China–Africa relations have included the lack of transparency in Chinese aid policy and its 
lack of focus on African democracy and good governance (Tull 2006; Hanauer and Morris 
2014). Concerns also have been raised about Chinese economic activities using African 
resources and markets to achieve national objectives while crowding out local industries 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2008; Kaplinsky, McCormick and Morris 2008; Jenkins and Edwards 
2015). Others have cited China’s limited protections for the environment, labour rights and 
local livelihoods (Bosshard 2008; Lyons and Brown 2010; Otu-Tei 2014).  
 
                                                        
3 The China Development Bank – one of China’s three policy banks and its largest overseas lender – provided a total of 
US$3bn in seed funding, attracting more than US$1.6bn in Chinese FDI. In 2013, the fund formulated a plan to invest 
US$2.83bn in 75 projects with the potential to draw an additional US$15bn into Africa. A year later, during his visit to the African 
Union in Ethiopia, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced that the fund would receive an additional US$2bn in financial 
support. 
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1.3 UK–Africa cooperation 
As a former colonial power, the UK’s engagement in Africa extends back 400 years and is 
now based on the shared history, language and culture that this interaction produced. At 
present, there are 18 Commonwealth nations in Africa, accounting for one third of the 54 
countries on the continent. While the Commonwealth comprises a voluntary association of 
former British colonies and other countries shaped by the once-vast British Empire, it 
nonetheless represents an important link between the UK and Africa.4 This sustained 
relationship is evident across all forms of economic engagement, including trade, investment 
and development assistance.  
 
In 2014, the UK exported US$11.6bn in goods to sub-Saharan Africa, principally consisting 
of machinery and equipment, road vehicles and chemical products. Between 2004 and 2014, 
UK exports to the region grew by approximately 5.6 per cent year-on-year, with the top 
destinations including South Africa, Nigeria, Botswana, Angola, Kenya, Ghana and Senegal. 
In each of these nations, the UK enjoys a strong position among imported goods, maintaining 
a 4 to 5 per cent share of total imports (UNCTAD n.d.). This trade relationship has been 
further strengthened by the new set of Economic Partnership Agreements that the EU signed 
in 2014 with three of the region’s major trading blocks (together representing 35 African 
countries). As for investment, UK FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa registered US$5.7bn in 
2014, with total UK FDI stock amounting to US$39.9bn that year (OECD n.d.).  
 
UK development assistance, meanwhile, remained relatively stable from the early 1960s until 
1999 when it began to increase rapidly – both in total quantity and in proportion to gross 
national income. In 2011, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) issued its 
Action Plan for Africa 2011–2015, further augmenting African aid and adjusting its focus to 
the region’s poorest countries. In 2014, the UK disbursed approximately US$3.7bn in net 
official development assistance (ODA) to sub-Saharan Africa, or 35 per cent of its total 
bilateral aid budget (OECD n.d.).  
 
Compared with China, the UK has placed more emphasis on recipient countries’ ‘soft’ 
sectors, devoting almost half of its development assistance budget to education, health and 
other social infrastructure; it also designated 41 per cent of its budget for multilateral aid in 
2014 (OECD n.d.). Conversely, a much smaller proportion of UK development assistance is 
dedicated to those areas that China emphasises, namely, infrastructure and productive 
sectors; and China’s multilateral aid comprises a mere 10 per cent of its budget (Kitano and 
Harada 2014). Aside from health and education, the UK’s other target areas include civil 
society and government capacity building, fiscal support, technical cooperation, private 
sector support and security (OECD n.d.). In terms of this last area, the UK has developed a 
comprehensive global conflict prevention mechanism involving the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), DFID and the UK Ministry of Defence. From planning to 
operations and implementation, the programme has far-reaching influence in Africa (Zhang 
2014). 
 
Not unlike China–Africa engagement, UK–Africa policy is also evolving. First, the UK has 
sought to update its engagement framework and strengthen cooperation with the whole 
continent, especially southern Africa. Second, it has expanded its development programme 
to encompass a combination of aid, investment and cooperation, attempting to build a UK–
Africa relationship based on equal rights and shared responsibilities. Third, it has begun to 
increase its official support for infrastructure and trade, perhaps an indication of China’s 
influence on prevailing development models. Fourth, it has altered its approach to 
conditionality and discontinued previous practices of hard-selling democracy. Instead, it now 
stresses mutual partnership and ownership, strengthening aid to African countries that of 
                                                        
4 In addition to the Commonwealth, other key platforms for UK–Africa interaction include the Commission for Africa, EU–AU 
Summit, G8 Summit and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 
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their own accord have pursued reform and good governance. Finally, in an effort to remedy 
past weaknesses, it has expanded cooperation with other western partners in the form of 
administrative staff exchanges and capital support (Cargill 2011; FCO 2015).  
1.4 China–UK–Africa cooperation 
Although initially wary of China–Africa engagement, the UK has gradually realised that 
Chinese influence in Africa does not preclude its own role, or that of other countries, and 
indeed can offer complementarity for cooperation in supporting African development. There 
is now evidence that China and the UK have shifted away from independent and exclusive 
operations towards a mutual recognition of their respective roles, functions and policies in 
Africa (DFID 2014). In turn, Chinese and UK policy interactions in Africa have transformed 
into an important part of their bilateral relationship.  
 
Over the past five years, China and the UK have used their bilateral relationship to 
coordinate policies in Africa. In February 2009, at the first China–UK Business Summit,5 the 
then British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao agreed on 
a plan for China–UK–Africa agricultural cooperation. The two countries now hold an annual 
high-level Dialogue on Africa, in which they exchange views on concrete measures to 
support African development and further their trilateral cooperation. In December 2013, 
British Prime Minister David Cameron attended the third China–UK Business Summit, which 
concluded with commitments from China and the UK to explore cooperation on infrastructure 
investment and construction in Africa.6  
 
At the ministerial level, DFID and its Chinese counterparts have explored opportunities for 
collaboration in Africa. In 2011, DFID and China’s Ministry of Commerce signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to create a partnership to enhance development 
cooperation and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. That same year, in conjunction 
with the Congolese government and China, DFID helped develop environmental and social 
guidelines for new Chinese-financed highway projects. In 2014, DFID signed another MoU, 
this time with China Development Bank, for a partnership to promote economic growth and 
poverty reduction in Africa.  
 
International and multilateral organisations have also served as a platform for China–UK–
Africa cooperation. For example, through various World Bank mechanisms, such as the 
World Bank Trust Fund, DFID, the Export–Import Bank of China, Chinese Ministry of 
Finance, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and Chinese companies have all cooperated on 
numerous small projects across Africa. DFID has also supported the World Wildlife Fund in 
its cooperation with Chinese government agencies, banks and companies to promote 
environmentally sustainable investment and trade with Africa (World Wildlife Fund 2011). 
During 2009 and 2010, the UK government, the Chinese Training Centre for Peacekeeping 
Civil Forces and the Kofi Annan International Training Centre for Peacekeeping together 
organised three training classes for African peacekeeping forces in China and Ghana (Hirono 
and Xu 2013). In addition, in 2009, the UK provided funding for a joint research group to 
study how African countries can utilise international aid effectively to enhance poverty 
reduction.7  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 The China–UK Business Summit is the highest-level platform for dialogue among Chinese and UK business circles. 
6 As a result of this summit, the China International Contractors Association (CHINCA) signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the British Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE).  
7 The research group consisted of representatives from the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the Poverty 
Alleviation Centre of the State Council of China.  
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Box 1.1 Trilateral cooperation in African agriculture 
In January 2010, at the first Africa–UK–China Conference on Agriculture and Fisheries in Beijing, 
meeting participants reached a consensus on the principles, priorities and mechanisms for trilateral 
cooperation. Two years later, at the second Africa–UK–China Conference on Agriculture and 
Fisheries, a new programme – Working in Partnership to Accelerate Agricultural Technology Transfer 
– was officially launched to help African countries improve agricultural production capabilities and 
address global food security challenges.8 The programme’s first two pilot projects were initiated in 
Malawi and Uganda with the hope that this innovative model could eventually provide valuable lessons 
for future trilateral cooperation among Chinese, UK and African partners targeting poverty (World 
Affairs 2014). 
 
                                                        
8 Marking the launch of this project, two documents were signed: a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Transfer 
of Agricultural Technology among China, Britain, and Uganda and a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on 
Transfer of Agricultural Technology among China, Britain, and Malawi. 
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2 A framework for China–UK–Africa 
trilateral cooperation  
 
Drawing on the past experiences of China–Africa, UK–Africa and China–UK–Africa 
engagement, this section presents a framework for trilateral cooperation targeting poverty. It 
first explores the advantages that this modality offers to participating development partners; it 
also points out some challenges. It then details priority areas for poverty reduction and the 
complementarities that China and the UK possess in each of these areas. Finally, it 
discusses potential platforms and mechanisms for operationalising this framework.  
2.1 Trilateral cooperation: advantages and challenges  
The triangular modality provides several advantages compared with other forms of 
development cooperation. It can provide international public goods more efficiently while 
reducing risk for large-scale projects, especially in countries marked by political unrest, poor 
investment environments and high default rates. It can also draw together the 
complementary capacities of disparate actors to leverage more resources than might have 
been possible within a bilateral partnership. For instance, emerging partners can contribute 
relevant strategies learned over the course of their own development. Established partners 
meanwhile can utilise their international cooperation experience, providing effective 
institutional frameworks and offering access to large global and local networks. In some 
cases, a partner might share a similar linguistic, cultural or historical background with the 
host government, lowering language barriers and preventing misunderstanding. In essence, 
triangular cooperation can foster inclusive horizontal relationships that facilitate mutual 
learning and accountability. It can also create regional synergies and positive spillovers into 
diplomatic and commercial relations. 
 
Despite its many advantages, triangular cooperation must surmount the coordination and 
harmonisation issues that accompany any project with additional independent actors. Indeed, 
disparate development cooperation regimes, standards frameworks, conditionalities and 
stakeholder interests can result in higher transaction costs, asymmetrical information and 
coordination breakdowns with adverse development outcomes. At the same time, triangular 
cooperation does not automatically guarantee that beneficiaries set the agenda; established 
and emerging partners can still dominate negotiations, ultimately engendering unequal 
partnerships. As a relatively recent modality, triangular cooperation has produced a high 
volume of small-scale projects, raising additional concerns about fragmentation within the 
development community (Special Unit for South–South Cooperation, UNDP 2009). 
2.2 Priority areas for poverty reduction cooperation in Africa  
There are three priority areas for poverty reduction cooperation in Africa: infrastructure, 
agriculture and trade facilitation. Although many development programmes previously 
focused on the social side of poverty and on building human capacity, the rapid 
infrastructure-led growth of East Asia and subsequent reduction in impoverished populations 
has renewed interest in infrastructure as a key component of poverty alleviation. Indeed, 
inadequate power, transport, water and communication networks can hinder economic 
activity by increasing transaction costs, reducing productivity, impeding the movement of 
goods and preventing the creation of new markets (UN-HABITAT 2011). Africa currently 
faces severe shortages across all forms of infrastructure. In 2009, the African Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic project reported that the whole of sub-Saharan Africa produced about the 
same amount of power as that of Spain, a country with one-eighteenth the population (AICD 
2010: 5). As such, many African countries have prioritised infrastructure. According to the 
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African Union’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 2012–2040, the 
continent will require more than US$360bn in infrastructure investment (African Union 2010: 
5). Domestic resources alone will not be able to meet this requirement; here, China and the 
UK can help fill the gap.   
 
Specifically, China and the UK can mobilise their complementary capacities in infrastructure 
‘hardware’ and ‘software’ to achieve high-standard outcomes. China enjoys a comparative 
advantage in the physical construction of infrastructure, offering low costs, skilled workers, 
mature technologies, substantial sector experience and abundant capital. Meanwhile, the UK 
possesses more experience in project design, professional skills support, technical personnel 
training, localisation of operations and management and corporate social responsibility. 
Together, China and the UK can call on leading enterprises in these fields to work jointly on 
infrastructure projects. They can also collaborate on regional infrastructure projects.9 
 
The second priority area is agriculture. Across Africa, agriculture employs approximately half 
of the total labour force, and for the 64 per cent of the population who live in rural areas, it is 
their main source of income (World Economic Forum 2015: 37). Nevertheless, over the past 
50 years, agricultural productivity has made limited gains. Africa’s crop yields are among the 
lowest in the world, with cereal yields at one-half to one-third the global average. 
Consequently, the continent has become a net importer of food, importing US$35bn in food 
products in 2014 (US$25bn in staples alone). At about 1.7 times the value of exports, these 
agri-food imports have resulted in trade deficits and further inhibited the development of 
domestic and export-driven agricultural markets (NEPAD 2013: 29). Given this situation, it is 
clear that African agriculture presents both incredible potential for poverty reduction and 
serious challenges for raising productivity and ensuring food security.  
 
Both China and the UK possess valuable experience in agricultural development. During 
China’s early reform era, agricultural development played a central role in poverty reduction. 
Moreover, as the population grew and urbanised, the country managed to raise agricultural 
productivity and address food security concerns. As such, China offers relatively strong 
technical advantages in crop and plant cultivation, animal husbandry, horticulture and 
fisheries. For its part, the UK has accumulated abundant experience in the management of 
African aid projects, agricultural training, agricultural technology and farm management. So 
far, China and the UK have cooperated on agricultural technology transfer projects in Malawi 
and Uganda. They could consider expanding their cooperation into other African countries 
such as Ethiopia and Mozambique, both central to the UK development programme and 
home to China’s agro-technology demonstration centres, effectively leveraging established 
resources.  
 
The third priority area is trade facilitation. Recently, African countries have taken significant 
steps towards enhancing intra-regional trade and driving overall export-led growth. In June 
2015, the continent’s three major trading blocks (the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and East 
African Community (EAC)) launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area, harmonising preferential 
trade schemes across 26 African countries in a concerted effort to promote regional 
integration. Negotiations are ongoing within the African Union for an even more 
comprehensive Continental Free Trade Area including all 54 African countries (UNCTAD 
2015). Despite these achievements, Africa faces serious supply-side issues – particularly 
among poorer potential market players – related to inadequate infrastructure, low agricultural 
yields, limited domestic resources and other non-tariff barriers to trade (UNECA 2015). 
Recognising these constraints, both China and the UK have supported various trade 
facilitation programmes in Africa. One such programme is the WTO-led Aid for Trade (AfT) 
                                                        
9 In 2013, China reaffirmed its support of partnerships for Sino-African transnational and trans-regional infrastructure 
construction (State Council 2013).    
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initiative that mobilises concessional finance to reduce trade barriers in developing 
countries.10  
 
With respect to trilateral cooperation on trade facilitation, it is important to note that China 
and the UK each offer competitive products to trade with Africa, and their trade partners 
seldom overlap. In other words, China–Africa trade does not create an obvious substitution 
effect on UK–Africa trade, thus providing a foundation for trade-related cooperation to reduce 
poverty. Specifically, China can contribute its policy and sector expertise in export-led growth 
and the penetration of global markets. Considering African trade’s intimate link with 
infrastructure and agriculture, many of the comparative advantages that China offers in these 
areas can be applied here as well, ultimately improving productive capacities and increasing 
export opportunities. The UK can complement this effort with its experience in building global 
value chains, particularly those focusing on EU markets.  
2.3 Platforms and mechanisms 
At least initially, China, the UK and African partners could utilise their high-level bilateral 
relationships to build a solid foundation for trilateral cooperation and ensure sufficient political 
will and ownership among all parties. In this pursuit, China and the UK could draft a Strategic 
Plan for China–UK Cooperation in Africa, setting out in broad terms mutually beneficial 
objectives, priority areas and implementation mechanisms. Later, a collaborative task force 
could be established to explore more specific opportunities for regional and country-level 
engagement. This task force should aim for maximum flexibility and work with existing 
agencies to avoid programme duplication. Actual mechanisms for trilateral cooperation 
likewise should reflect the variety of resources and tools available across aid, trade and 
investment channels – from aid for trade to project bonds and equity to co-financing vehicles 
to public–private partnerships.  
 
                                                        
10 At its 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, the World Trade Organization (WTO) launched the Aid for Trade (AfT) 
Initiative, subsequently setting up the Task Force on Aid for Trade in February 2006 to mobilise the initiative. Both China and 
the EU were among the 13 WTO members on the Task Force. According to the latest data, in 2013, the UK disbursed 
approximately US$1.4bn in AfT, with about US$692m for Africa. Most recently, in October 2015, it contributed £500,000 
(US$772,900) to assist developing countries in the implementation of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (WTO 2015). For 
further discussion of AfT, see Section 3.4 of this Evidence Report.  
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3 The cases: Kenya and South Africa  
 
The following section begins with an overview of recent economic trends and poverty 
reduction in Kenya and South Africa, comparing their performance with sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole. It then details Chinese and UK engagement in the two case countries, focusing 
on activities in the areas of trade, investment and development assistance.  
3.1 Economic performance and poverty reduction  
It is clear that Kenya and South Africa occupy different development stages. Where Kenya’s 
GDP per capita is about 83 per cent of the average for sub-Saharan Africa, the South African 
figure is more than three and a half times the regional average (see Table 3.1). Likewise, the 
two countries exhibit distinct economic structures. South Africa maintains a very small 
agricultural sector (similar to that in developed countries) while Kenyan agriculture 
constitutes almost one-third of the national economy, or roughly twice the average for sub-
Saharan Africa. In South Africa, non-manufacturing industrial sectors (e.g. mining and 
extractive industries) play an important role – although still secondary to services, which 
dominate at 68 per cent of GDP. For Kenya, however, these two sectors still contribute well 
below the regional average.  
 
These indicators notwithstanding, Kenya has outperformed both South Africa and sub-
Saharan Africa in terms of GDP growth over the past five years. From 2010 to 2014, Kenya 
averaged about 6 per cent growth, recording a healthy rate of 5.3 per cent in 2014. By 
contrast, since 2008, South Africa has exhibited slower growth more or less comparable to 
developed nation rates but below average for sub-Saharan Africa (around 4 per cent), 
declining to 1.5 per cent in 2014. Resource endowments cannot explain the differences in 
recent economic performance between the two case countries. The China-led resource 
boom of the past 15 years should have boosted economic growth in resource-rich South 
Africa. Instead, South Africa has failed to keep pace with other resource-endowed countries 
on the continent, suggesting energy and iron ore prices might have been a factor. Structural 
problems related to income inequality, low-skilled labour, corruption and high unemployment 
also might have prevented South Africa from returning to the high growth rates that 
characterised the pre-recession period from 2002 to 2008. Contrary to this, Kenya enabled 
its strong recent growth mostly by an expansion in modern services and the subsequent 
increasing demand for traditional services. In total, 72 per cent of the increase in GDP 
between 2006 and 2013 came from the service sector (World Bank Group 2016). 
 
Although Kenyan and sub-Saharan African exports contracted in 2013, it appears that these 
markets recovered over the following year. South Africa fared well comparatively, registering 
4.6 per cent and 2.61 per cent growth in exports for 2013 and 2014, respectively. South 
Africa’s more diversified export structure might have shielded the country from commodity 
price fluctuations, possibly explaining its better export performance. In terms of their current 
accounts, both countries presented significant deficits in 2014, with a particularly acute 
imbalance in Kenya. As developing countries under economic transformation, this is not 
necessarily an urgent problem but sustainable financing of these deficits will constitute a key 
policy challenge. As for inflation, in 2014, Kenya and South Africa exhibited almost 
equivalent consumer price increases of 6.88 per cent and 6.38 per cent, respectively; these 
figures are just slightly above that calculated for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (4.39 per 
cent).   
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Table 3.1 Key economic indicators, 2014 
Measure Kenya South Africa sub-Saharan Africa 
GDP (current US$bn) 60.94 349.82 1,728.32 
GDP growth (annual %) 5.33 1.52 4.24 
GDP per capita, PPP (current international US$) 2,954.08 13,046.21 3,568.63 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2.58 -0.06 1.45 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 30.27 2.49 13.96 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 19.36 29.47 27.61 
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 11.11 13.29 10.95 
Services, value added (% of GDP) 50.37 68.05 58.40 
Exports of goods and services (annual % 
growth) 
2.31 2.61 3.13 
Current account balance (% of GDP) -10.40 -5.46 - 
Consumer price index (2010 = 100) 140.91 124.43 - 
Population, total (millions) 44.86 54.00 974.32 
Population growth (annual %) 2.64 1.58 2.74 
Source: World Bank (2015). 
 
Poverty reduction data for the two case countries and the region as a whole is very limited, 
primarily based on estimates using imperfect international poverty lines. Nonetheless, using 
the data available, it would appear that both case countries saw a reduction in the 
percentage of the population living on US$1.90 a day, with a slightly larger decline in Kenya 
than in South Africa (see Table 3.2). Moreover, it would seem that the two countries have 
outperformed sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of both their total ratios and poverty reduction 
over time.  
 
The reduction in South Africa’s poverty gap is also notable, suggesting that by 2011 the 
average daily income of people under the threshold was just 4.9 per cent short of US$1.90. 
More recent data for Kenya is not yet available; that said, 2005 data indicates a larger 
poverty gap than that calculated for South Africa. As for food deficits among the 
undernourished, South Africa exhibited better performance overall. Kenya also managed to 
improve the depth of the food deficit over the past ten years, but still lags behind the regional 
average.  
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Table 3.2 Key poverty reduction indicators 
Measure Year Kenya South Africa sub-Saharan Africa 
Poverty headcount ratio 
at US$1.90 a day (2011 
PPP) (% of population) 
2005 33.6 23.13** 51.2*** 
2011 23.7* 16.56 45.1*** 
Poverty gap at US$1.90 
a day (2011 PPP) (%) 
2005 11.7 7.23** - 
2011  4.9 - 
Depth of the food deficit 
(kilocalories per person 
per day) 
2005 229 27 179.58 
2011 158 24 146.24 
2014 156 16 136.84 
Note: * Kenya has not provided official poverty data since undertaking its last national household survey in 2005. Reddy and 
Lahoti (2015) provided a preliminary estimate of 23.7 per cent for Kenya’s US$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) poverty headcount ratio 
in 2012, cautioning that country-level data could be inaccurate. In their 2014 joint paper on Kenya’s poverty reduction strategy, 
IMF and World Bank staff estimated that using the old threshold of US$1.25 per day, Kenya’s poverty headcount ratio had 
declined from about 47 per cent in 2005–06 to 39 per cent in 2012–13; ** 2006 World Bank data; *** Reddy and Lahoti (2015) 
also provided poverty headcount estimates for sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 and 2012 using the new US$1.90 a day line (2011 
PPP).  
Source: World Bank (2015); Reddy and Lahoti (2015). 
3.2 Chinese and UK trade 
In the last decade, China’s share of case country exports and imports has increased 
significantly. Between 2004 and 2014, merchandise exports to China increased more than 
eight-fold from South Africa and almost five-fold from Kenya (see Table 3.3). Nevertheless, 
China remained a relatively small market for Kenya. Over the same period, the UK’s share of 
total exports declined by more than half from both Kenya and South Africa. These export 
trends are similar to the performance of China and the UK globally but the importance of the 
UK as a market for African exports has decreased dramatically. Import trends mirror that of 
exports: UK shares have fallen while Chinese shares have increased significantly to the point 
that for both case countries, China is their largest single source of imports.11  
 
As for trade structures, China and the UK import quite different bundles of products from 
South Africa and Kenya.12 More generally, the trade concentration index13 shows that sub-
Saharan African export structures to the world, the UK and China are much more 
concentrated than the import structures. The increased export concentration likely reflects 
increased volume demand from China and consequent increases in prices. Also noteworthy 
is that Kenya is relatively less successful at penetrating the Chinese market than South 
Africa or sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, perhaps as a result of trade policy obstacles. The 
next two sections will examine these trade trends for each case country.  
 
                                                        
11 In South Africa, only the European Union – with its 28 member countries – surpasses China, with 27.8 per cent of total 
imports in 2014.   
12 These findings are based on the Finger Kreinin Index of structural similarity, which varies from 1 to zero where 1 implies 100 
per cent overlap of commodity structure and zero implies completely independent export structures. An index of 0.2 thus can be 
interpreted as a 20 per cent commodity overlap. 
13 The trade concentration index varies from zero to 1, with a higher index indicating more concentrated trade by commodity. 
For example, an index of 1 would signify only one product was traded. Conversely, the closer the index is to zero the more 
products are traded.  
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Table 3.3 Chinese and UK Merchandise Trade with Kenya and South 
Africa 
Measure Year Kenya South 
Africa 
sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Exports (US$m) 2004 3,250 40,264* 152,327 
2014 7,037 90,612 402,971 
Chinese share in exports (%) 2004 0.52 2.62 8.62 
2014 1.09 9.58 17.34 
UK share in exports (%) 2004 12.01 10.47 6.73 
2014 5.79 3.82 3.20 
Imports (US$m) 2004 5,343 47,398 133,592 
2014 22,396 104,738 425,373 
Chinese share in imports (%) 2004 6.53 6.23 7.42 
2014 22.02 14.99 19.19 
UK share in imports (%) 2004 6.41 7.29 5.54 
2014 3.00 3.74 2.72 
Structural similarity of exports to China 
with respect to the world 
2012 0.23** 0.35  - 
Similarity of structure of exports to China 
with respect to the UK 
2012 0.22** 0.11 0.1143 
Similarity of structure of exports to UK 
with respect to the world 
2012 0.43** 0.37  - 
Concentration of exports to China 2014 0.222* 0.471 0.613 
Concentration of exports to the UK 2014 0.461* 0.364 0.481 
Concentration of exports to the world 2014 0.194 0.119 0.392 
Concentration of imports from China 2014 0.077* 0.115 0.065 
Concentration of imports from the UK 2014 0.123* 0.125 0.100 
Concentration of imports from the world 2014 0.147 0.152 0.086 
Note: All import data and Kenyan exports reported by partner countries; South African and sub-Saharan African exports 
reported by origin; * UNCTAD estimates; ** 2010 data.  
Source: UNCTAD (2016) via UNCTADStat, ‘International trade in goods and services’; TRALAC via UN COMTRADE (2015).  
3.2.1 South Africa 
There is a high degree of product concentration in South African exports to China while 
South African imports from China are much more diversified. In 2014, South Africa’s top ten 
exports to China accounted for 94 per cent of total exports to China while the top ten exports 
to the UK accounted for 85 per cent of total exports to UK (ITC n.d.). The top exported 
products are mostly those with zero Chinese Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status (except for 
wool). There are some manufactured products that South Africa successfully exports to the 
rest of the world but not to China. The top exports to the UK are mostly products with zero 
tariffs but also agricultural products with preferences from the EU Trade and Development 
Cooperation Agreement.  
 
Many imports from China and the UK carry high South African MFN tariffs.14 Moreover, in 
some of the top imported products from the UK, where the South African MFN tariff is zero, 
                                                        
14 South African MFN tariffs fell sharply between 1996 and 2004, stabilising thereafter around a mean of 7.5 per cent (World 
Databank 2015). 
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the UK data does not show a global comparative advantage, perhaps due to tastes or non-
tariff barriers favouring the UK. China, meanwhile, faces tariffs higher than those extended to 
the UK. On the top 20 imported products, the average tariff paid by China was 18.4 per cent, 
while the UK faced a minimal 1.3 per cent in 2014 (ITC n.d.).15 It is clear that China 
successfully exports products even where South African tariffs are particularly high (for 
instance, in textiles).   
 
Product differentiation coupled with global product manufacturing and distribution chains is 
important in the China–UK–South African case. In recent years, the Trade and Development 
Cooperation Agreement has served as a key feature of South African–EU trade, and as a 
central component of the EU, the UK has likewise benefited from this agreement. 
Conversely, there are no tariff concessions to China, and on the contrary, South Africa 
placed quantitative restrictions on imports in several lines of textiles and clothing from China 
during 2007 and 2008, and then increased tariffs after this measure proved ineffective. While 
the quotas restricted Chinese imports, they encouraged trade from other import sources 
rather than stimulating South African domestic production (Centre for Chinese Studies 2009). 
 
Under the current scenario, with the exception of transport equipment, China is consistently 
outperforming the UK in the South African market. Between 2004 and 2014, the value of 
South African imports from China grew from US$2.95bn to US$15.7bn, a more than five-fold 
increase. By contrast, imports from the UK barely increased from US$3.45bn to US$3.92bn 
over the same period. Total South African imports, meanwhile, grew at an annual rate of 12.1 
per cent, just slightly lower than the country’s annual export growth of 12.5 per cent. For 
manufacturing, China’s share increased from 8.21 per cent to 22.08 per cent while 
conversely the UK’s performance declined from 7.16 per cent to 4.12 per cent (UNCTAD 
n.d.). Unquestionably, China is a highly competitive player in the South African 
manufacturing market. Only in transport did the increase in UK imports outperform the 
Chinese equivalent, while in no sectors did South African exports to the world outperform the 
equivalent imports from the world.  
3.2.2 Kenya  
In 2014, China just barely made Kenya’s list of top 20 export destinations, with Hong Kong 
and mainland China respectively ranking 18th and 19th. That said, from 2004 to 2014, its 
share of Kenyan exports doubled, albeit to 1 per cent. China, meanwhile, was the largest 
source of imports in 2014, with a share of 22 per cent and a total value of US$4.9bn in 2014. 
In contrast, the UK has seen its share decline by half as both a destination of exports and an 
origin of imports for Kenya – despite modest increases in these trade flows between 2004 
and 2014 from US$390m to US$408m and from US$343m to US$672m, respectively. At the 
broadest product classification level, Chinese and UK exports to Kenya are in line with the 
Kenyan import structure. As for Kenya’s export market, there is some evidence of divergence 
between what it exports to China and what it exports to the world. Over time, the composition 
of exports to China and the UK has grown more similar. When compared with import 
composition, however, it is still very distinct. Indeed, the top five exports from Kenya to China 
were leather, coconut fibres, copper, ores and scrap plastics; the top five exports to the UK 
were black tea, cut flowers, legumes, fresh vegetables and perfume plants.16  
 
Kenya has maintained high tariffs on the top 20 Chinese imports, which include electronic 
equipment, machinery, vehicles, clothing and furniture. The top 20 products imported from 
the UK – also led by vehicles, machinery and electrical equipment – entail lower tariffs. 
Kenyan exports likewise face substantially lower tariffs in the UK than they do in China. For 
example, on Kenya’s chief exports (i.e. tea, cut flowers and food products), the UK and 
                                                        
15 For all imported products in 2014, China faced an average tariff of 10.5 per cent while the UK paid 3.1 per cent (ITC n.d.).  
16 The UK does not import these products from China; at the same time, China maintains high tariffs on tea and fresh 
vegetables.  
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China maintain average MFN tariffs of 0 per cent and 10 to 13 per cent, respectively. The UK 
largely imports products within these key export markets. It also accounts for a significant 
share of Kenyan service exports (30 per cent), especially transportation and travel. China, on 
the other hand, largely focuses on ores, leather and copper, and to a lesser extent, imports 
tea, food and cut flowers (ITC n.d.).  
3.3 Chinese and UK investment  
Although South Africa enjoys approximately one-third of total FDI stock in sub-Saharan 
Africa, in terms of annual FDI flows it is now closely followed by Congo, Mozambique and 
Nigeria. In contrast, foreign investment in Kenya has been exceedingly low, both for flows 
and stock, with 0.9 per cent of total FDI stock for sub-Saharan Africa in 2014 (see Table 3.4).  
 
For South Africa, the UK serves as the dominant investment partner, maintaining US$21bn in 
2012 FDI stock. China follows some way behind the US and Switzerland with nearly 
US$4.8bn in 2012 FDI stock, or almost 26 per cent of its total FDI stock in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Using the EDGE FDI Database, Gelb (2014) reported that there were more than 
2,000 foreign operations in South Africa, of which only 74 (or 3.7 per cent) were Chinese, 
and that there were more than 3,500 operations of South African firms offshore, with about   
1 per cent in China. For Chinese stocks in South Africa, the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China’s 20 per cent holding in Standard Bank was the largest single holding, followed by 
six Chinese companies with investments in mining and metal manufacturing. Conversely, in 
2010, only four South African companies had holdings in China: Bidvest, Sappi, Sasol and 
Naspers (Gelb 2010).  
 
Kenya receives a marginal share of Chinese and UK investment flows, perhaps reflecting the 
former’s lack of natural resources relative to the rest of the continent. In 2012, Chinese FDI 
stock in Kenya amounted to a meagre US$403m. While the UK stock position in Kenya is 
double its Chinese counterpart, it is a mere twenty-fifth of UK stock in South Africa. 
Compared with the UK, China has devoted a slightly higher – but still tiny – percentage of its 
total FDI stock to Kenya. The small difference in FDI distribution is also reflected at the 
regional level, with China designating approximately 3.5 per cent of its total 2012 FDI to sub-
Saharan Africa while the UK contributed not quite 1.5 per cent.   
 
Overall, China is rapidly increasing its investment presence in Africa. This trend 
notwithstanding, inbound investment figures for Kenya – an agriculture-based economy – do 
not indicate a large buying up of land resources (Bräutigam 2015). Likewise, Gelb’s findings 
do not support the idea of a growing Chinese ‘intrusion’ into South African industrial 
capabilities (2010, 2014). Indeed, with annual flows and total stock 2.5 times their Chinese 
counterpart, the UK still represents the principal investor in the region.  
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Table 3.4 Comparing Chinese and UK FDI in Kenya and South Africa 
Measure Year Kenya South Africa sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Total FDI flows (US$m) 2014 989 5,712 42,948 
Total FDI stock (US$m) 2014 4,370 145,384 492,791 
Chinese FDI flows (US$m) 2012 79 -815 2,152 
UK FDI flows (US$m) 2012 -9  8,036 7,437 
Chinese FDI stock (US$m) 2012 403  4,775  18,552  
UK FDI stock (US$m) 2012 841  21,189 45,719 
Chinese FDI stock (% of China total) 2012 0.08 0.90 3.49 
UK FDI stock (% of UK total) 2012 0.05 1.23 1.46 
Chinese FDI stock (% of destination total) 2012 14 2.9 4.2 
UK FDI stock (% of destination total) 2012 29.24 12.96 5.63 
Source: UNCTAD via UNCTADStat, ‘Foreign Direct Investment’, 2015; UNCTAD, ‘Bilateral FDI Statistics’, 2014; OECD via 
OECD.Stat, ‘FDI Flows and Positions by Partner Country’, 2015.  
3.4 Chinese and UK development assistance 
Development assistance comprises one of the most challenging forms of international 
engagement to assess and compare across countries. It has taken donor countries, through 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee, many years to agree on a definition of what 
constitutes official development assistance and how to measure it. Meanwhile, China largely 
operates outside the OECD governance regime, compelling the development community to 
reconsider current definitions and criteria.  
 
Until recently, the Chinese government did not publish development assistance data. In 
2011, the State Council issued its first white paper on China’s foreign aid, presenting only 
aggregate data covering all years up until 2009. The second white paper, published in 2014, 
represented a modest improvement in transparency; nonetheless, it again contained only 
aggregate data for 2010–12 and did not include any specific statistics at the country level. 
Further complicating the situation, Chinese classifications of foreign assistance differ from 
those of the Development Assistance Committee, rendering some official data ineligible for 
comparison. At present, most figures for China’s development assistance are estimates.  
 
Given these data limitations, it is therefore difficult to compare Chinese and UK engagement 
in Kenya and South Africa across all development assistance indicators. In general, China’s 
officially reported development assistance to Africa has risen rapidly over the last decade, 
reaching US$7.5bn for 2010–12; the proportion of total assistance dedicated to the continent 
has also increased, from 45.7 per cent in 2009 to 51.8 per cent in 2012 (State Council 2011, 
2014). For its part, the UK disbursed approximately US$10.4bn in gross ODA to Africa over 
that same three-year period.  
 
At the country level, there is only UK data available for development assistance (see Table 
3.5). In 2014, the UK provided Kenya with about US$216m in gross ODA, making the African 
nation its 11th largest recipient worldwide.17 To South Africa, it provided US$79m in gross 
ODA in 2014.18 For Kenya and South Africa, the UK ranked as the second and fourth largest 
sovereign donor, respectively. Of its total ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in 2014 (US$4.2bn), 
the UK dedicated 5.1 per cent to Kenya and 1.9 per cent to South Africa. For that year, 
                                                        
17 In 2014, the UK’s net ODA to Kenya was US$222.3m.  
18 In 2014, the UK’s net ODA to South Africa was US$29.7m.  
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Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone served as the top three recipients of UK ODA in the 
region.  
 
For this study, there exists another important development assistance metric to consider: Aid 
for Trade (AfT). As mentioned in the previous section, China has played a key role in the 
WTO’s Aid for Trade Initiative. Furthermore, throughout its overseas activities, the country 
has consistently emphasised its support of trade-related assistance and other forms of 
development finance that crosscut trade, aid and investment. Based on China’s 2014 white 
paper, a very rough estimate of total Chinese AfT to the world would be about an average of 
US$2.4bn per year from 2010 to 2012.19 Concurrently, global AfT has been increasing, and 
at a rate faster than that of total ODA disbursements. Between 2006 and 2014, global AfT 
doubled from US$21bn to US$42.5bn; over the same period, total ODA registered a 
negligible increase from US$227bn in 2006 to US$228bn in 2014 (constant prices).20 The 
growing AfT share in total ODA suggests development partners are shifting their focus to 
economic development and in particular, to the role of export-led growth. To some extent, 
this trend may have resulted from China’s success in using export-led growth to help reduce 
poverty.  
 
The UK likewise has seen its AfT rise as a proportion of ODA, from 3.2 per cent in 2006 to 
8.6 per cent in 2014.21 In total, it provided approximately US$1.6bn in AfT in 2014, with 
US$614.3m designated for sub-Saharan Africa. As for the two case countries, in 2014, the 
UK contributed US$49.1m in AfT to Kenya; to South Africa, it provided US$45.2m. For that 
year, Kenya and South Africa respectively received 8 per cent and 7.4 per cent of total UK 
AfT in sub-Saharan Africa. While the two countries received similar amounts of UK AfT, the 
UK constituted a far greater share of South Africa’s total AfT receipts (13.3 per cent); in 
2014, it contributed just 4.9 per cent of Kenya’s US$1bn in AfT receipts. It is clear, however, 
that for both Kenya and South Africa, UK AfT comprises an important part of total UK 
development assistance. Indeed, almost a quarter of UK ODA to Kenya is AfT, and more 
than a half is AfT for South Africa.  
 
                                                        
19 According to the 2014 white paper, approximately 50.8 per cent of the total development assistance budget for 2010–2012 
(US$14.4bn) was devoted to economic infrastructure, agriculture and industry – the key categories of AfT. For China, economic 
infrastructure included transport and communications, broadcasting and telecommunications and power supply; agriculture 
included agricultural technology demonstration centres, irrigation and water conservancy and agricultural processing; and 
industry included light industry and textiles, building materials and chemical industry and machinery and electronics.  
20 In 2007, global ODA disbursements declined to US$175bn. Comparing 2007 and 2014, global ODA registered a more 
significant increase of 30 per cent – albeit still lower than global AfT’s increase of 85 per cent over that same period.   
21 Within AfT, the UK has primarily focused on economic infrastructure in transport and storage, energy generation and supply, 
agricultural productive capacity and banking and financial services. 
22 
 
Table 3.5 Comparing UK and global gross ODA and AfT disbursements, 
2014  
Measure Kenya South Africa sub-Saharan 
Africa 
World 
UK ODA 
Constant 2013 
US$m 
216 79 3,918 18,572 
Annual % growth, 
2006–2014 
9.4 -1.4 -3.6 5.3 
UK AfT 
Constant 2013 
US$m 
49.1 45.2 614.3 1,622 
Annual % growth, 
2006–2014 
64.5 58.8 78.2 35.1 
Global 
ODA 
Constant 2013 
US$m 
2,968 1,296 46,994 227,811 
Annual % growth, 
2006–2014 
16.8 4.6 -6.4 0.04 
Global AfT 
Constant 2013 
US$m 
1,043 340 11,292 42,517 
Annual % growth, 
2006–2014 
46.8 31.9 15.7 12.8 
Source: OECD via OECD.Stat, ‘Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions’ and ‘Creditor Reporting System’, 2016.  
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4 Opportunities, challenges and 
recommendations 
 
Considerable potential exists for China–UK cooperation to boost trade and in turn facilitate 
poverty reduction in Kenya and South Africa. Bringing together the study’s framework with 
the current situation of its case countries, this section explores opportunities for China–UK 
cooperation in linking South Africa into global value chains, expanding investment in Kenya, 
facilitating trade among all four economies and sharing information.  
4.1 Linking South Africa into global value chains  
When carefully considering local economic conditions and requirements, integration into 
global value chains can raise productivity, create jobs and promote structural transformation 
(AfDB, OECD and UNDP 2014). This is particularly true for African countries that manage to 
increase the domestic value added in their exports as a percentage of GDP (ibid.). In 2011, 
about 57 per cent of South African exports were connected to global value chains through 
either backward or forward participation, making the country the tenth most integrated in 
Africa (World Economic Forum 2015: 73).22 According to the 2014 African Economic Outlook, 
South Africa has transformed into a ‘headquarter economy’ in Southern Africa, playing a key 
intermediary role similar to that of Germany in Europe and the United States in North 
America. Between 1995 and 2011, South Africa’s use of intermediates imported from its 
neighbours increased nine-fold while regional use of South African intermediates increased 
five-fold (AfDB et al. 2014: 26). For products that reached their final destination within the 
local market, the country’s financial and business services exhibited the highest proportion of 
domestic value added, with almost 90 per cent in 2009 (OECD 2013: 2). Whether through 
logistics, communications, insurance, product design or marketing, the services sector has 
also contributed significantly to South African manufacturing, representing 30 per cent of 
value added in manufacturing exports in 2009 (ibid.).  
 
For their part, the UK and China can encourage firms to exploit the potentially important role 
of South African services and suppliers in global value chains. Specifically, they can explore 
whether any outsourced processes can be relocated to South Africa. Concurrently, investors 
can notify South African suppliers of outsourcing opportunities so that the latter can bid for 
the services and products in which they maintain a comparative advantage. That said, China 
and the UK should also consider opportunities in low-skilled activities, not just those 
industries where South Africa has a comparative advantage such as mining services.  
 
South Africa’s key obstacles to building global value chains are primarily internal: low-skilled 
workers dependent on the informal economy need to be brought into more formal 
employment, a process even more important than the restoration of high-end manufacturing 
exports. An increase in ‘value added’ industrial exports from South Africa may require 
domestic policy interventions to stimulate job creation favouring low-skilled labour, at least 
initially. In the long run, enhancing skills will be a key challenge (AfDB et al. 2014: 161). 
There are products that South Africa – like Kenya – exports to the rest of the world, notably 
automotive products to the EU and Japan, but not to China. It is worth exploring opportunities 
for South African exports to China while ensuring that trade barriers do not harm domestic 
firms’ insertion into global value chains by increasing the costs of imported intermediates.  
                                                        
22 In 2011, the African continent represented 2.2 per cent of global value-added trade. Albeit small, this share has expanded by 
60 per cent since 1995. In relative terms, just over 50 per cent of the continent’s total exports exhibited forward or backward 
linkages, making Africa the third most integrated region in global value chains behind Europe and Southeast Asia (World 
Economic Forum 2015: 73). 
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4.2 Expanding investment in Kenya  
At present, South Africa serves as the continent’s top destination for UK and Chinese FDI, 
with a combined total of US$26bn compared to Kenya’s US$1.2bn in 2012. Nevertheless, 
Kenya exhibits modest growth and investment potential across a range of industries. For the 
most part, China and the UK have invested in different sectors of the Kenyan economy. 
While China concentrates on road and telecommunications infrastructure, the UK primarily 
supports the financial and professional services sector with more minor investments in 
renewable energy, education and aviation.  
 
Given the significant demand for infrastructure construction and real estate in Kenya, these 
sectors could serve as an important area for collaboration among Chinese and UK firms. For 
large infrastructure projects, Chinese construction could be paired with British financial 
services to lower risk, attract capital and ultimately improve the overall investment 
environment. Indeed, for many Chinese firms in Kenya, infrastructure development has been 
a key determinant of a favourable business environment. In terms of infrastructure finance, 
China and the UK could cooperate through a variety of investment vehicles such as project 
bonds, project equity, joint contracting and co-financing. 
 
The importance of infrastructure notwithstanding, it is crucial to stimulate investment in other 
sectors of the economy, particularly those sectors where additional scope for local sourcing 
can be found. Here, China has sought to support agricultural development and 
manufacturing. For its part, the UK could locate new opportunities for partnership in 
professional and financial services and lend its expertise in these sectors. To attract 
additional investment, Kenya faces some major obstacles. According to a survey conducted 
by CUTS Nairobi, Chinese firms’ principal concern was corruption, while UK firms 
enumerated other issues, including taxation, energy costs and the rules and regulations 
governing business in Kenya.23 For both countries’ firms, security and acts of terrorism were 
also a major challenge. To help address this latter concern, the UK could consider expanding 
the Kenyan programmes it has implemented under the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. 
Together with Chinese and Kenyan partners, it could also organise joint trainings for 
peacekeeping forces similar to those held in Ghana.  
4.3 Boosting trade and lowering barriers  
Kenya is relatively less successful at penetrating the Chinese market than South Africa or 
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, perhaps as a result of trade policy obstacles. Over the past 
decade, Kenyan exports have not increased in concert with the sharp rise in Chinese imports 
and non-resource investments. China is not importing much from Kenya, but is importing 
products from the rest of the world that also appear in Kenya’s top 20 exports. Many Kenyan 
competitors receive preferences in China under the duty free treatment for least developed 
countries. Kenya faces MFN tariffs in coffee, tea, flowers and legumes while some of its 
African and Asian competitors benefit from preferential trade regimes. China could consider 
Kenya for similar GSP-type preferences,24 even though such a decision could erode 
preferences for exporters in least developed countries. At the same time, the country’s links 
with the UK remain strong but static. For the foreseeable future, the East African 
Community–EU Economic Partnership Agreement will serve as the foundation for UK–
Kenyan trade relations. Nevertheless, potential implementation issues exist related to EU 
non-tariff barriers to trade and EU export subsidies, notably in agricultural trade.  
 
Reducing non-tariff barriers to trade among the four partner countries could generate positive 
impacts for local livelihoods. Using World Bank data, Jensen and Sandrey (2015) simulated 
                                                        
23 In 2015, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Kenya 139 out of 168 in terms of how corrupt the 
public sector is believed to be by surveyed businesses and experts.  
24 GSP refers to the Generalised System of Preferences that exempts least developed WTO member countries from MFN 
tariffs. Least developed countries contribute a minor proportion of Chinese imports in coffee, flowers and vegetables.  
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50 and 20 per cent reductions in trade barriers and found welfare-enhancing effects for all 
partners – especially for South Africa and Kenya. The reductions also contributed to 
increases in exports, imports and employment opportunities. During the simulation, changes 
to trade barriers were made in isolation of any reductions to tariffs, infrastructural blockages 
and service-related business costs. If included, these three factors would likely have been 
additive to the current results and possibly of a greater level (Jensen and Sandrey 2015). In 
light of this simulation exercise, China and the UK should pursue further studies assessing 
whether there are significant non-tariff barriers in their respective markets for Kenya and 
South Africa.25 The two countries could subsequently establish consultation mechanisms 
dedicated to trade barriers adversely affecting Kenyan and South African exporters. In 
addition, taking a long-term view, they could jointly conduct feasibility studies of Free Trade 
Agreements demonstrating a clear focus on development benefits. 
 
As noted earlier, Kenyan and South African export success will depend to a large extent on 
improving local infrastructure, increasing agricultural productivity and building global value 
chains. China and the UK could consider cooperation on Aid for Trade initiatives in these 
areas. They could also work together to help Kenya and South Africa adapt to international 
standards and rules, improving their customs, tax, inspection and quarantine facilities. 
Furthermore, they could cooperate on regional trade integration projects, skilled worker 
training and the construction of economic and trade cooperation zones.  
 
With regard to agricultural productivity, they could establish a China–UK–Africa policy 
research taskforce on agriculture and rural development. This has the potential to strengthen 
the training of skilled agricultural workers, help to set up specialised regional training centres 
and conduct food processing and agricultural commerce training. China and the UK could 
strengthen the popularisation of certain agricultural techniques and transfer technology to 
Kenya to help improve the level of agricultural mechanisation and agricultural machinery 
production as well as increase access to agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, pesticides, etc. 
They could also enhance agricultural infrastructure, improve the trading capacity of 
agricultural products, cultivate agricultural markets, help accelerate production times and 
reduce costs.  
4.4 Sharing information and enhancing transparency  
Across all of the opportunities described here, China and the UK should seek open dialogue 
and transparency. The UK has adopted an open and transparent strategy for development 
support, such that data on official flows to Kenya and South Africa is readily available online. 
Chinese data and information is much more limited, potentially complicating coordination 
efforts and placing undue burden on host governments to ensure transparency.  
 
In the context of China–UK–Africa cooperation, it is thus essential to establish regular 
communication and share information among key stakeholders. At the government level, 
DFID, the UK Department of Trade and Industry and China’s Ministry of Commerce could set 
up a strategic platform for dialogue, hosting roundtable meetings periodically. These 
agencies could consider sharing less sensitive material for publication, such as Memoranda 
of Understanding with African partners. In addition to official communication, expert and 
academic exchange could enhance mutual understanding, increase transparency and create 
research synergies. Chinese, UK and African experts could hold seminars on major policy 
issues, such as on growth, competitiveness, innovation, cooperation and development as 
well as conduct joint research on novel methods for achieving poverty reduction in Africa. 
Collaborative research initiatives could be pursued in the fields of food and agriculture, 
physical and social infrastructure, trade, sustainable urbanisation, natural resource 
management and technology transfer. 
                                                        
25 An earlier study identified significant sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and other barriers into China for South Africa 
(Sandrey et al. 2008).  
26 
 
References 
 
AfDB, OECD and UNDP (2014) Global Value Chains and Africa’s Industrialisation: African 
Economic Outlook 2014, Paris: OECD Publishing 
 
Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) (2010) ‘Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for 
Transformation – Overview’, Washington DC: World Bank Group, 1–27 
 
African Union (2010) Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa – Interconnecting, 
Integrating and Transforming a Continent, Addis Ababa: African Union 
 
Australian Centre on China in the World (2014) ‘Li Keqiang’s “461 Framework” for the China–
Africa Strategic Partnership’, 25 June, www.thechinastory.org/dossier/li-keqiangs-461-
framework-for-the-china-africa-strategic-partnership/ (accessed 28 Nov 2016)  
 
Bosshard, P. (2008) China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa, Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies Working Papers in African Studies 1, Washington DC: Johns 
Hopkins University, 1–19  
 
Brautigam, D. (2015) Will Africa Feed China?, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Cargill, T. (2011) More with Less: Trends in UK Diplomatic Engagement in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Chatham House Africa Programme Paper 3, May, London: Chatham House 
 
Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch (2009) ‘The China Monitor: South 
Africa-China textile quotas’: Recent developments and trade prospects, February, Centre for 
Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch 
 
China Development Bank (2014) Annual Report 2013, 30 April, Beijing: China Development 
Bank  
 
Department for International Development and Rt Hon Justine Greening MP (2014) An End 
to Poverty: Justine Greening’s Speech to the China International Development Research 
Network, Beijing, China, 2 April, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/an-end-to-poverty-
justine-greenings-speech-to-the-china-international-development-research-network 
(accessed 28 Nov 2016)  
 
Dollar, D. (2016) China’s Engagement with Africa. From Natural Resources to Human 
Resources, Washington DC: The John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings 
 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2015) UK’s Africa Policy: High Commissioner Speech at 
Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana, 27 August, 
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uks-africa-policy-high-commissioners-speech-at-legon-
center-for-international-affairs-and-diplomacy-university-of-ghana (accessed 11 January 
2017) 
Gelb, S. (2014) South Africa’s Foreign Direct Investment Links with the BRIC Countries, 
World Trade Institute/Mandela Institute Working Paper, September, 1–27  
 
Gelb, S. (2010) Foreign Direct Investment Links between South Africa and China, 
Johannesburg: The EDGE Institute, November, 1–62  
 
27 
 
Gu, J. (2009) ‘China’s Private Enterprise in Africa and the Implications for African 
Development’, European Journal of Development Research 21.4 
 
Gu, J. and Carty, A. (2014) ‘China and African Development: Partnership not Mentoring’, IDS 
Bulletin Special Issue: China and International Development, 45.4: 57–69, 
http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/article/view/161 (accessed 10 November 2016)  
 
Gu, J. and Schiere, R. (2011) ‘Post-Crisis Prospects for China–Africa Relations’, in R. 
Schiere and L. Ndikumana (eds), China as an Emerging Partner for Africa, Tunis: African 
Development Bank 
 
Gu, J.; Chuanhong, Z. and Mukwereza, L. (2016) ‘Chinese State Capitalism? Rethinking the 
Role of the State and Business in Chinese Development Cooperation in Africa’, Open 
Access Special Issue 81, World Development 
 
Gu, J.; Holmes, P.; Rollo, J. and Mendez-Parra, M. (2015) ‘Trilateral Cooperation on Trade 
and Investment: Implications for African Industrialisation’, IDS Policy Briefing 103, Brighton: 
IDS 
 
Hanauer, L. and Morris, L. (2014) Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and 
Implications for U.S. Policy, RAND Corporation Research Report, 1–152  
 
He, W. (2011) ‘From Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness: the Change of Aid 
Philosophy and the Role of China’s Experience’, Western Asia and Africa, November 
 
HM Treasury and Rt Hon George Osborne MP (2015) UK Intends to Become a Prospective 
Founding Member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 12 March, 
www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-announces-plans-to-join-asian-infrastructure-investment-
bank (accessed 28 Nov 2016)  
International Trade Centre (ITC) (n.d.) Trade Map via UN COMTRADE Database, 
www.trademap.org/Index.aspx (accessed 11 January 2017) 
Jenkins, R. and Edwards, L. (2015) ‘Is China “Crowding Out” South African Exports of 
Manufactures?’, European Journal of Development Research 27, 903–20  
Jensen, H. and Sandrey, R. (2015) ‘African Agricultural Trade: Recent and the Future’, 
African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 10.2: 146–57  
Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. (2008) ‘Do the Asian Drivers Undermine Export-Oriented 
Industrialization in SSA’, World Development 36.2: 254–73 
Kaplinsky, R.; McCormick, D. and Morris, M. (2008) ‘China and sub-Saharan Africa: Impacts 
and Challenges of a Growing Relationship’, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 
Studies Working Papers in African Studies 5, 1–27  
Kitano, N. and Harada, Y. (2014) Estimating China’s Foreign Aid 2001–2013, JICA Research 
Institute Working Paper No. 78, June, 1–24 
Li, X. and Huang, J. (2012) ‘The Policy Adjustment of the UK’s Aid to Africa’, International 
Economic Cooperation, April 
 
Lyons, M. and Brown, A. (2010) ‘Has Mercantilism Reduced Urban Poverty in SSA? 
Perception of Boom, Bust, and the China–Africa Trade in Lomé and Bamako’, World 
Development 38.5: 771–82 
28 
 
 
Hirono, M. and Xu, M. (2013) ‘China’s Military Operations Other than War’, The RUSI Journal 
158.6: 74–82 
 
NEPAD (2013) ‘Agriculture in Africa: Transformation and Outlook’, Johannesburg: African 
Union, November, 1–75  
 
OECD (2016) ‘Dispelling the Myths of Triangular Co-operation’, Evidence from the 2015 
OECD Survey on Triangular Co-operation, Paris: OECD Publishing 
OECD (2013) ‘Global Value Chains (GVCs): South Africa’, May, 1–4, Paris: OECD 
Publishing 
OECD (n.d.) via OECD.Stat, https://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed 11 January 2017) 
Otu-Tei, C. (2014) ‘Broken Promises: Ghana’s Bui Dam Resettlement’, International Rivers, 
19 March  
People’s Republic of China Information Office of the State Council (State Council) (2014) 
China’s Foreign Aid (2014), July, white paper, People’s Republic of China: Information Office 
of the State Council  
 
People’s Republic of China Information Office of the State Council (State Council) (2013) 
China’s Cooperation with Africa on Economy and Trade 2013, August, white paper, People’s 
Republic of China: Information Office of the State Council 
 
People’s Republic of China Information Office of the State Council (State Council) (2011) 
China’s Foreign Aid (2011), April, white paper, People’s Republic of China: Information Office 
of the State Council 
 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Rt Hon David Cameron MP (2015) China State Visit 
will unlock more than £30 billion of commercial deals, 20 October  
 
Reddy, S. and Lahoti, R. (2015) $1.90 Per Day: What Does it Say?, The New School for 
Social Research Working Paper 25, November, 1–36  
 
Sandrey, R.; Smit, L.; Fundira, T. and Edinger, H. (2008) Non-tariff Measures Inhibiting 
South African Exports to China and India, Tralac Working Paper 6  
 
Schiere, R. (2011) China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development? An 
Overview of Issues, African Development Bank Group Working Paper Series 125, May 
 
Schmaljohann, M. and Prizzon, A. (2015) Age of Choice: How Developing Countries are 
Managing the New Aid Landscape, London: Overseas Development Institute 
 
Special Unit for South–South Cooperation, UNDP (2009) ‘Enhancing South–South and 
Triangular Cooperation’, Study of the current situation and existing good practices in policy, 
institutions, and operation of South–South and triangular cooperation, New York: Special 
Unit for South–South Cooperation, UNDP 
 
Tull, D. (2006) ‘China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance, and Consequences’, 
Journal of Modern African Studies 44.3: 459–79  
 
29 
 
UNCTAD (2015) ‘The Continental Free Trade Area: Making it Work for Africa’, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, December, Geneva: United Nations 
Publication  
 
UNCTAD (n.d.) via UNCTADstat, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html (accessed      
11 January 2017) 
 
UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2015) Reducing Trade Costs to Support 
Africa’s Transformation: The Role of Aid for Trade, 1–51, Addis Ababa: UN Economic 
Commission for Africa 
 
UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2012) Economic Report on Africa 2012: 
Unleashing Africa’s Potential as a Pole of Global Growth, March, 1–168, Addis Ababa: UN 
Economic Commission for Africa 
 
UN HABITAT (2011) ‘Infrastructure for Economic Development and Poverty Reduction in 
Africa’, Global Urban Economic Dialogue Series, 1–98 
 
World Affairs (2014) ‘How to Carry out Multilateral Cooperation in Africa’, November  
 
World Bank (2015) World Development Indicators 2015, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank Group (2016) ‘Kenya – Country Economic Memorandum: from Economic Growth 
to Jobs and Shared Prosperity’, March, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
World Economic Forum (2015) Africa Competitiveness Report 2015: Transforming Africa’s 
Economies, 1–185, Geneva: World Economic Forum  
 
World Wildlife Fund (2011) ‘China–Africa: Facilitating Dialogue and Engagement for 
Sustainable Trade and Investment’, WWF briefing, April, 
http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/china_africa_poverty_environment.pdf (accessed            
1 December 2016) 
 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2015) ‘UK Donates GBP 500,000 for Trade Facilitation 
Agreement Facility’, WTO Press Releases, 30 October  
 
Zhang, Y. (2014) ‘The UK’s Cooperation with Africa on Security: Route, Characteristics, and 
Revelation’, Western Asia and Africa, April 
 
Zhang, Y. (2013) ‘Mutually Beneficial and Win-Win Development of China’s Aid to Africa’, 
Huanqiu, 1 April  
 
Brighton BN1 9RE 
T +44 (0)1273 606261 
F +44 (0)1273 621202 
E ids@ids.ac.uk
www.ids.ac.uk
IDS_Master Logo
